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It is widely recognised that labour has been downplayed in the literature on global value chains 
(GVCs) and global production networks (GPNs). While several scholars have tried to bring labour 
“back in” to GVC research, others suggest this agenda does not go far enough and fails to challenge 
mainstream political and economic assumptions. Taking its cue from calls for a “re-formulated 
research agenda” for labour in GPNs, this paper uses a case study of  capital and labour relations in 
India’s rapidly growing automotive industry to posit an analytical framework that can sufficiently 
recognise workers’ “co-constitutive” role in the operation, reproduction and restructuring of  
commodity chains dominated by powerful global corporations. 
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Many scholars have questioned the absence of  labour in studies of  global value chains (GVCs), 
which focus on commodity chains dominated by powerful “lead firms”. This has led to several 
attempts to “bring labour back in” to GVC-based research. This article uses a case study of  the 
automotive industry in North India to demonstrate how a modified research agenda can provide new 
insights on the structural dimensions that shape and limit working-class subjectivity in GVCs. The 
article draws upon Selwyn’s (2012) call for a “re-formulated research agenda” in the GVC field. 
Selwyn argues that the role of  the state and its relationship to capital, processes of  working-class 
formation and the capacity to transform the strategic position and place of  workers in GVC 
structures into class power are all critical elements for this agenda. In adopting this framework for 
our case study, we suggest there is a need for two further key elements: first, the need to incorporate 
social structures and social relations that are not reducible to the capital–labour relation and have 
separate causal mechanisms, including gender and caste; and second, the need to more clearly 
incorporate the structural power of  lead-firm capital and inter-firm commercial relations into an 
analysis of  working-class subjectivity. 
The second section looks at attempts to integrate labour studies with GVC research, including 
competing explanations for its absence. The greatest potential in this literature, we argue, lies in 
efforts to frame labour as “co-constitutive” in the capitalist development process alongside the role 
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of  international capital in shaping commercial and employment relations. The third section applies 
our modified research framework to the auto industry in India’s National Capital Region (NCR). The 
research was based upon fieldwork among employees, employers, labour contractors and trade 
unionists in the region. Here, we also aim to explain the types of  firms that operate in the supply 
chain in the NCR, the employment practices adopted by firms in different tiers of  the industry, as 
well as the impact of  these practices on workers. We aim to demonstrate how the interaction of  
capital and labour subjectivities with institutions, gender and caste led to a high level of  industrial 
conflict in the past fifteen years and the emergence of  more recent forms of  labour struggle which 
cast doubt upon the dominant regional model of  labour relations. 
 
 
Bringing Labour “Back in” to GVC Research?
The absence of  labour in GVC studies has been widely acknowledged in different disciplines 
(Starosta, 2010; Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi, 2011; Riisgaard and Hammer, 2011; Lakhani, 
Kuruvilla and Avgar, 2013; Taylor, Newsome and Rainnie, 2013). Carswell and De Neve (2013: 62) 
suggest that articles on governance or labour standards “typically end with a paragraph on labour, 
usually concluding that labour employed at the tail end of  the network needs further empirical 
research”. Labour has tended to be treated as an “object” rather than a “subject” with its own set of  
interests: “Little has been said about labour as an active constituent of  the global economy, rather 
than the passive victim of  restructuring processes” (Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge, 2008: 369).  
These insights challenge the foundations of  GVC research, which remains largely focused on 
commercial relations between firms. GVC analysis flows historically from world systems analysis, 
which defines capitalism as “production for profit for world markets”, thus downplaying labour 
relations in the production process (Selwyn, 2012: 210; Newman, 2012). Following the logic of  this 
critique, our analysis draws upon Selwyn’s (2012) call for a “reformulated research agenda” on labour 
in GVCs. Selwyn argues that such an agenda should incorporate three elements:  
 
(i) how states preside over and guarantee reproduction of  capital–labour relations, (ii) 
processes of  working class formation and (iii) workers’ structural power as derived from the 
requirements of  commodity production, and how it can be transformed into associational 
power, to wrest concessions from capital and the state (Selwyn, 2012: 217).  
 
In welcoming this framework, we argue for the inclusion of  two further points. First, 
processes of  commodity production and integration in global markets rely upon social structures 
that transcend capital–labour relations. These include gender, ethnicity and, especially in the South 
Asian context, caste. India’s economy is dominated by commodity production in informal enterprises 
in which it is normal for production and occupations to be structured by caste-based relations 
(Harriss-White, 2003; Basile, 2013). Firms operating within GVC production in India commonly take 
advantage of  pre-existing production networks and work arrangements: “The informal economy and 
its regulatory mechanisms are increasingly incorporated into neo-liberal global production 
structures” (Mezzadri, 2008: 605).  
Second, a research agenda for labour in GVCs should incorporate the role of  individual firms 
– especially supplier firms as well as lead firms – as strategists and actors who aim to improve their 
relative position in markets and should incorporate the commercial relations between these firms. Of  
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course, this partly represents the traditional focus on GVC research on the role of  lead firms as 
potential agents of  social and labour upgrading (Bair, 2009; Barrientos et al., 2011). In this sense, 
explicit incorporation of  individual firm strategy is about combining the existing focus of  GVC 
research on governance and commercial relations with labour scholars’ focus on social relations in 
sites of  production. This is crucial to labour-oriented research because, as we hope to demonstrate in 
our case study, commercial relations between firms have a major impact on labour conditions and 
strategies within firms.  
In order to apply this modified framework, we use a case study of  the auto industry in 
northern India, specifically the automotive cluster in the National Capital Region of  New Delhi. On 
a global level, the auto industry is dominated by transnational vehicle assemblers known as Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). In a single generation, India has evolved from a country in 
which privately owned passenger cars and even two-wheelers were a rare luxury to become the 
world’s sixth-largest auto manufacturer (OICA, 2015). Suppliers tend to cluster near assembly plants. 
In India, the dominant clusters are in the southeast (Chennai), west (near the city of  Pune) and north 
(in the NCR) (Gulyani, 2001; Barnes, Lal Das and Pratap, 2015). The industry is structured as a series 
of  tiers. Tier 1 firms supply components to the OEMs. Tier 2 factories supply parts and materials to 
Tier 1 firms, Tier 3 firms supply to Tier 2 firms, and so on. In GVC terms, the auto industry has 
been framed as a “relational value chain” characterised by close collaboration and interdependence 
between OEMs and suppliers in different tiers (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005; Lakhani et 
al., 2013: 454). However, despite significant research on employment relations in the global auto 
industry, studies of  auto workers have barely featured in the GVC literature. 
This article focuses on the cities of  Faridabad, Gurgaon and Manesar in the State of  Haryana, 
on the southern fringe of  New Delhi. These urban centres dominate the NCR auto cluster. 
Surrounded by semi-rural villages, Gurgaon and Manesar grew into major industrial townships in the 
1990s and 2000s which provide the base for Maruti Suzuki India Limited’s (MSIL) production 
facilities as well as two-wheeler OEMs, Honda Motorcycles and Scooter India (HMSI) and Hero 
Motorcorp. Faridabad is an older industrial area on New Delhi’s southern border and home to a large 
number of  components manufacturers.  
There have been a few studies of  employment conditions in Indian auto components 
manufacturing (Awasthi, Pal and Yagnik, 2010; Suresh, 2010; Barnes et al., 2015). The most thorough 
studies of  labour include an NGO report on the Chennai auto cluster (Gopalakrishnan and Mirer, 
2014) and Bose and Pratap’s (2012) study of  the NCR cluster in the early 2000s, which found that 
most workers were low-wage, inter-state migrants, mainly from Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh 
(UP). However, relatively little has been documented about the conditions of  workers employed in 
enterprises below Tier 2. The information in the following sections is based upon fieldwork 
conducted in the NCR over seven months in 2011, 2012 and early 2013 as well as secondary-source 
analysis. Interviews were conducted with workers, managers and owners in OEMs, Tier 1, 2 and 3 
firms, as well as labour contractors and trade union officials (see Appendix for details). Although we 
mention the names of  some OEMs, we use codes to describe all supply firms to protect the identity 
of  participants. The Appendix contains a full list of  codes and data sources in our study.  
 
 
Applying the Modified Framework to Auto Workers
This section applies the modified, five-point framework discussed above to the case of  auto workers 
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in the NCR industrial cluster. The first sub-section examines the structure of  the auto global value 
chain in the NCR, including the dominant role of  OEMs, their impact upon the functions and 
operations of  supply firms and the consequences for work, employment relations and labour 
conditions in lower-tier firms. The second sub-section looks at the role of  state institutions and 
regulation in the historical evolution and structural dynamics of  the automotive GVC, followed by a 
brief  outline of  historical working-class formation in different tiers of  the industry in the third sub-
section. The fourth sub-section discusses the impact of  gender and caste relations on the individual 
roles, functions and divisions of  labour in the industry. Finally, we explore the connections between 
workers’ structural and associational power in different tiers. In each of  these five sub-sections, the 
paper will attempt to draw out implications for workers in OEMs, Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 firms.  
 
GVC structure, firm strategy and governance
As outlined in the previous section, the auto industry has been framed in the GVC literature as a 
relational value chain with high levels of  direct and frequent interaction between lead firms and 
suppliers. Our fieldwork suggests that OEMs exert a high level of  control over suppliers in multiple 
tiers by specifying design and quality requirements, by frequently monitoring production within 
supply firms, setting prices and controlling the frequency at which suppliers are paid. Maruti Suzuki 
India Ltd, a joint venture between the Government of  India and Japanese OEM Suzuki, was the 
pioneer in establishing this relational GVC in the region. MSIL managers adopted the Japanese 
“lean” practice of  subcontracting to supplier firms. By the mid-1990s, about half  of  MSIL’s top one 
hundred suppliers were located within 80 km of  its Gurgaon assembly plant, with a quarter based in 
Gurgaon itself  (Gulyani, 2001: 117–123). While some of  these suppliers operated in a joint venture 
with MSIL, it was also common for MSIL to have a majority shareholding with their key suppliers 
and to exercise direct control over their management. 
MSIL also exercised influence over employment relations throughout the supply chain. This 
can be seen in the evolution of  its own employment relations practices and the transformation of  
practices among its suppliers since the 1990s. In the 1980s, MSIL used above-average wages and 
productivity-based wage bonuses to recruit and retain workers (Ishigami, 2004: 4–5; Becker-
Ritterspach, 2007: 8–10). But management moved to change this regime in the 1990s, as 
manufacturing investment laws were liberalised and market competition increased. 
MSIL managers responded by reducing bonus payments and restructuring the productivity-
based pay scheme, causing the company’s first strike in 2000–2001 and eventually leading to the 
defeat and deregistration of  the workers’ trade union. Following its victory, management reduced the 
number of  permanently employed (or “regular”) workers employed at the Gurgaon plant from 5 770 
in 2001–2002 to 3 334 by 2004 (Becker-Ritterspach, 2007: 40). After 2001, MSIL relied upon 
recruitment through labour contractors and, by 2004, about 2 000 regular positions were replaced by 
these “contract workers” who were paid about a quarter of  a regular workers’ salary (GWN, 2009). 
By 2007, the Gurgaon factory employed about 1 800 regular workers and 4 000 workers hired 
through twenty different labour contractors. MSIL implemented a similar policy at its new Manesar 
factory which, by 2011, employed 1 000 regular workers, 800 trainees, 400 apprentices and 1 200 
workers hired through contractors. 
Using labour contractors significantly reduced labour costs through lower wages and the denial 
of  regular workers’ entitlements, such as productivity and holiday bonuses, and the denial of  a range 
of  allowances. By 2011, regular workers at MSIL’s Manesar factory earned 13 000 to 17 000 per 
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month (roughly $US200–250) compared to workers hired by contractors earning about 6 500 (less 
than $US100) (GWN, 2011).1 
These practices were emulated by other OEMs in the region like Honda and Hero Motorcorp 
and by employers in many Tier 1 firms. In the sample of  OEMs, Tier 1 and Tier 2 firms in our study 
(n = 13), an average of  68 per cent of  employees were hired by labour contractors, ranging from a 
low of  35 per cent to a high of  98 per cent. Most contract workers earned a basic wage (i.e. before 
overtime, bonuses and allowances) close to the Haryana minimum wage.2 Most firms hire multiple 
labour contractors, of  which there are hundreds in the NCR competing to provide services for 
employers. For firms below Tier 2, there is no formally operating contract labour system. Of  the 
fourteen Tier 3 firms we studied, only one firm regularly hired labour contractors. At this level, most 
proprietors cannot afford to pay labour contractors’ fees and usually rely upon direct recruitment.  
Nevertheless, OEM control over the supply chain means that even in these smaller firms they 
exert considerable influence over employment relations practices. First, they encourage price 
competition among hundreds of  lower-tier suppliers. They exercise market power by regulating this 
competition through tight control of  prices. Second, they exercise hands-on supervision of  product 
quality. Even in Tier 3 firms, we met representatives of  OEMs visiting workshops and offices to 
check products. Third, cash flow in different supply companies filtered down through the tiers of  the 
industry to affect the frequency at which lower-tier suppliers were paid. Proprietors in Tier 3 had 
little control over the frequency with which they were paid.  
Several proprietors and managers explained how this control generated low-margin business. 
The owner of  firm 3E, whose seven employees made fuel lines for two Tier 2 firms and one OEM, 
explained: 
 
I have very good relations with my main customers. They provide ongoing and regular work. 
[One Tier 2 customer] uses 200 to 300 vendors to supply the parts. They totally depend 100 
per cent on vendors…. They send someone every one to two months to inspect parts. The 
person they send is checking for quality of  products. There is a lot of  competition. The rates 
charged by companies are falling due to competition based on low cost. Another problem is 
that customers do not pay in time. They are supposed to pay bills in sixty days but usually 
take up to 110 days to pay (15 April 2013).  
 
Another example is Firm 3I in Sanjay Colony, Faridabad, which employs sixty workers. The 
firm manufactures parts that are eventually processed for use by Honda, wheel parts for MSIL and 
tractor parts for agricultural equipment-maker Escorts. During a focus group, a skilled worker told 
us: 
 
There is cutthroat competition among vendors. Escorts hasn’t increased its parts prices in 
five years. Consequently, wages cannot go up among the suppliers. Each vendor competes on 
low-cost production, with many acting to undercut each other to win contracts.  
1Unless otherwise stated, all wages and salaries discussed in this article refer to monthly figures. 
2At the time of  our fieldwork, this was 5 330 per month, based on daily wages of  205, assuming a 26-day 
month. (Most workers we met worked six days per week.) For skilled labourers, the minimum wage was 230 
per day or 5 980 per month. 
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An unskilled worker (“helper”) added: 
 
There is no way wages can go up in this environment…. Buyers cannot increase the rate of  
parts so wages cannot go up. There is no point moving to a different employer [if  you are 
not happy with these wages]. The employers are united, the workers are not (Focus group, 
five workers, firm 3I, 18 April). 
 
The implications of  this low-wage environment for workers’ actions are discussed below. 
 
State governance, regulation and reproduction of capital–labour relations
Historically, Indian state institutions have protected and nurtured domestic auto production by 
segmenting and restricting the domestic market, by channelling foreign investment into joint 
ventures and by providing subsidies through cheap land and utilities. For example, MSIL’s success 
has significantly relied upon support from state institutions. Until the 1990s, the Government of  
India shielded MSIL from foreign competition in domestic passenger car production. For example, it 
blocked Honda’s attempt to establish a joint venture in car production with Telco (now Tata Motors), 
although it agreed to segment the two-wheeler and passenger car markets by allowing Honda to 
establish a joint venture with the Punjab-based Hero Group in motorcycle and scooter production. 
In the NCR, both MSIL and Hero Honda benefited from industrial subsidies allocated via the 
Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation (HSIIDC). For example, 
HSIIDC allocated land to MSIL and its key suppliers at below-market prices, including 330 acres in 
Gurgaon in 1982 and a further 250 acres in Manesar in 1996.  
After the 1980s, the state reshaped the practices of  industrialists by gradually liberalising 
foreign investment rules. As suggested above, the impact of  these changes on domestic market 
competition strongly influenced MSIL’s employment relations practices. In 1993, the government 
allowed automatic approval for foreign investment up to 51 per cent ownership in joint ventures. 
After 2000, the government allowed automatic approval for 100 per cent foreign ownership 
(Narayanan and Vashisht, 2008: 76).  
The domestic market for passenger cars, two-wheelers and commercial vehicles is highly 
competitive today, with most local operations wholly owned by foreign OEMs or domestic OEMs 
linked to Indian family conglomerates. Rising competition has underpinned the shift towards a 
regional contract labour system in the NCR. This system has made it extremely difficult for unions. 
The regional contract labour system means that the “principal employer” is able to eschew 
responsibility for many employment conditions. Most of  these workers are hired as ongoing 
production-line workers, in violation of  the Contract Labour (Abolition and Regulation) Act 1970.3 
 
Processes of working-class formation
The rapid rise of  auto production in the NCR since the 1980s has, understandably, had a major 
impact on workers and labour markets in the region. Like Bose and Pratap’s (2012) findings, most 
employees in our fieldwork came from towns, villages and cities interstate, mostly from Bihar and 
3See Shyam Sundar (2012) for an explanation of  the role of  this law and debate about the “contract labour 
system” in India.
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eastern Uttar Pradesh although many others came from Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand and even 
from Nepal. Most interview participants were unmarried men in their twenties and thirties who had 
been attracted to the region by the promise of  more secure employment and higher wages. For 
example, in contrast to the Haryana minimum wage of  5 330 per month, which provided a rough 
basis for casual and contract workers’ basic wages in the NCR, the minimum wage for unskilled 
labourers in Uttar Pradesh at the time of  our fieldwork was just 2 600.  
In higher-tier firms, labour contractors were encountered by migrant workers in a variety of  
ways. Many travelled directly to the factory gate where they met labour contractors’ representatives. 
In other cases, labour contractors were met after workers at a factory were asked by their contractor 
or a manager to invite relatives or friends to migrate for job opportunities. Sometimes, a contractor 
or manager would ask an agent to supply a fixed number of  workers from their home village or 
town, or contractors would send their own representative interstate to meet and recruit new workers. 
In our interviews with workers, it was normal for this system to leave workers in precarious 
employment. As a worker at firm 2B in Faridabad explained to us: 
 
I earn 5 700 to 6 000 with a six-month contract. My company has 500 workers [of  which] 
forty to fifty are regular workers who earn 25 000. The company has four factories in this 
area. After six months, I ask my labour contractor [thekedar] for more work. He offers me 
work in one of  the company’s other factories for another six months. So I have to move to 
there. I have worked like this for the past four years (15 April 2013). 
 
Workers in Tier 3 firms tended to be recruited directly due to lower profit margins which, 
proprietors explained, were too low to afford labour contractors’ commission (Interviews with 
proprietors at 3B to 3F inclusive, 9–15 April 2013). In industrial colonies in Faridabad, we observed 
dozens of  small workshops with signs advertising for different positions, including semi-skilled jobs 
like machine, drill or lathe operators and less-skilled jobs (“helpers”).  
However, we also found cases of  interstate migrant workers recruited via an informal system 
of  labour market intermediation which rested upon workers’ social networks, often via family 
members in industrial areas. A helper at firm 3B explained: “My brother was already working here 
[before I arrived]. He said the boss was looking for helpers and told me to come [from UP] for 
work” (8 April 2013). At firm 3G, a metal plating company in Mujessar, Faridabad, a young worker 
explained: 
 
I used to work as a tailor in Mumbai. But the company I was working with closed down. 
Simultaneously I used to also do the same thing as here which is plating of  auto parts. I 
acquired the skills for both the jobs. There were a few people from my village [near the city 
of  Gorakhpur in eastern UP] who were working here at the time. They suggested I come 
here and I that’s when I came to Delhi (6 December 2011). 
 
Role of social structures outside the capital–labour relation
Most of  the interstate migrant workers we interviewed had a caste background that fell within 
the official category of  Other Backward Classes (OBCs), which is historically used by the state to 
record numerous castes classified as socially disadvantaged. In our study, most workers came from 
cultivating families with marginal or small landholdings in Bihar or UP although some came from 
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lower-caste landless families in rural areas, including a minority of  Scheduled Caste or Dalit workers.  
In several Tier 3 firms, all employees hailed from OBC castes with a family background in 
small-scale cultivation (Interviews with: two workers at 3G, December 2011; proprietors at 3E and 
3F, 15 April 2013; five workers at 3I, 18 April 2013). The wages gap between different categories of  
workers in Tier 3 firms often followed caste lines. For example, at firm 3F, which employed a total of  
thirty-five workers in two workshops in Faridabad, the firm’s ten helpers were all OBC workers from 
UP or Bihar earning a basic (sub-minimum) wage of  4 800, which was less than half  of  a skilled 
worker’s wage. 
This does not mean that income differences mirror caste differences in an exact way. For 
example, while most OBC workers are hired as helpers, some are employed in skilled occupations. At 
firm 3F, we spoke to a skilled engineer from Lucknow with an OBC background. At firm 3B, 
although all workers at the firm’s workshop were OBCs from Bihar or UP, some were machine 
operators paid a basic wage of  10 000 – nearly double the wage of  helpers. Nevertheless, the 
prevalence of  OBC workers from interstate regions and the maintenance of  a low-wage 
environment meant that there was often an overlap between workers’ caste origins and their 
employment status. 
These origins mean that ties between workers throughout the industry and their home villages 
and towns are strong. It was common for workers to send 40 to 80 per cent of  their wage income as 
remittances to family members interstate and to return to their family homes every six to twelve 
months for festivals, weddings or to assist during harvesting, especially in wheat production. One 21-
year-old worker at firm 3G explained: 
 
I have worked here for one year. This is my first job. 4 800 is my basic pay and with 
overtime I earn about 7 000…. I work twelve hours a day and six days a week with Sundays 
as holidays…. [Since arriving in Gurgaon], I have gone home and spent three months there. 
My father is a farmer [in rural UP]. He has about five acres of  land. We barely manage to 
meet our domestic expenses but are unable to make any profit from the produce. I manage 
to send around 4 000 [home per month]. I somehow manage to live here on the money I 
get on my overtime pay (6 December 2011). 
 
The majority of  contract and casual workers we spoke to maintained similar ties to cultivating 
families. Some workers had brought spouses and children with them. The village of  Binola near 
Manesar illustrates this process. In Binola, there are about 500 local people, mainly landholding 
members of  the Yadav community, which comprises several castes historically linked to cattle 
rearing. Since several Tier 1 and Tier 2 auto firms have located here in the previous two decades, the 
population has swelled to between five and six thousand, of  which most are young unmarried men 
but about a third are migrant families (Interviews with unionists, regular workers and contract 
workers, firms 1C, 1E, 1I and 1J, March–April 2013). Elsewhere, in Udyog Vihar, Gurgaon, a 38-
year-old contract worker at steel forging firm 2C explained his desire to stay in the region on a 
permanent basis: 
 
I am married with one boy and one girl. We came here from Bihar…. I go home once per 
year. I send 2 500 to 3 000 per month home to my parents. I get paid 7 000. I normally 
work twelve-hour days, starting at 7 a.m. My wife works in garment exports. She earns about 
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the same. If  I lose my job, I will stay in this area and search for whatever job I can get. This 
can be in auto parts, in garments or whatever. I do not want to go back to Bihar (13 April 
2013).  
 
The proprietor of  firm 3G, who was originally from rural Bihar, explained to us:  
 
There are two types of  workers who come from Bihar [to Faridabad]. Workers who come 
here with their families permanently, and [who] go home occasionally for festivals or 
marriages. They work in industry. Most of  these workers own some land. These are medium-
sized plots and are used only for subsistence for families. [Second], there are agricultural 
labourers who migrate on a seasonal basis to Punjab or Haryana. They are the lower castes. 
Most of  the jobs in local industry are taken by workers from Bihar or eastern UP. But this 
not considered as taking jobs from locals [in Haryana]. Most of  the local workers are farmers 
[kisan] and they find industrial work to be derogatory. Maybe 60 per cent of  workers in this 
area are from Bihar and about 25–30 per cent from eastern UP and the rest from Punjab and 
other places (1 December 2011).  
 
It is important to emphasise that “industry” and “industrial work” in this workers’ narrative 
explicitly refers to small-scale workshops, not large factories. In fact, many local workers do work in 
larger-scale industry, particularly in OEMs or Tier 1 firms, and a small minority will work in Tier 3 
firms. However, the vast majority of  unskilled “helpers” are interstate migrants. In a few cases, this 
division of  labour was expressed in prejudiced terms. For example, the vice-president of  a steel 
forging firm, 2C, in Udyog Vihar, Gurgaon, told us:  
 
The Biharis are good for this heavy and hot work. They do not require qualifications. They 
are mostly helpers paid the government minimum wage. But they keep disappearing during 
the summer for harvesting and festivals. This is our main internal problem in the summer (11 
April 2013). 
  
While the vast majority of  workers in the industry are men, we also found a significant 
minority of  women, both married and unmarried, working in the industry. Most women were 
employed as “helpers”, undertaking a range of  manual tasks like cleaning, counting and sorting 
components. However, a smaller minority of  women in some firms were employed as skilled 
machine operators (Interviews: proprietor 3C, 9 April; proprietor 3K, 18 April, 2013).  
 While women working in the export garments sector or in various informal occupations is 
well-established in the NCR, some managers and workers explained that there was growing pressure 
for married women to seek employment in Tier 3 automotive enterprises. During a focus group with 
five workers (four unskilled employees and one skilled contractor) at firm 3I in Sanjay Colony, 
Faridabad, we were told that rising living costs and low wages were factors increasing pressure at a 
household level for male workers’ spouses to find work in local enterprises: 
 
Most families need 8 000 to 10 000 [per month to survive]. We have two options. We can 
work overtime or we can ask our wives to find work. Sometimes we have to borrow food 
from shopkeepers. During lean times, we can only pay landlords [rent] when we can. 
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Sometimes we ask our employer for more money [as a wage advance] to keep going (worker 
A, 3I, focus group, 18 April 2013).  
 
Now maybe half  the families in this area have both the husband and the wife working locally. 
This is increasing (worker B, 3I, focus group, 18 April 2013).  
 
Workers’ structural power and conversion into associational power
Selwyn’s use of  the concepts of  structural and associational power comes from Wright’s (2000) 
widely cited analysis. Structural power comes from the position of  workers within capitalism as a 
system of  production and distribution. Associational power comes from the collective organisation 
of  workers, including but not limited to the workplace itself. From Western European and North 
American perspectives, the global auto industry has strong traditions of  collective bargaining, leading 
to high wages and good working conditions. In part, this arises from the strategic importance of  
workers in global centres of  motor vehicle production. It is perhaps understandable that some 
scholars in the GVC literature have predicted that the global expansion of  auto production in 
emerging markets like India should lead to long-term, stable employment relations with decent 
labour conditions (Lakhani et al., 2013).  
In the NCR, the operation of  a regional contract labour system and a casualised, low-wage 
environment means that this prediction has not been fulfilled. Trade unions are active in the local 
auto industry, especially the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) and the Hind Mazdoor Sabha 
(HMS) and, to a lesser extent, the Centre of  Indian Trade Unions (CITU) and the New Trade Union 
Initiative (NTUI). However, the prevalence of  labour contractors in OEMs, Tier 1 and Tier 2 firms 
effectively prevents the majority of  workers from joining unions. To date, there are no local examples 
of  contract workers being organised into trade unions, even if  they have occasionally participated in 
industrial campaigns alongside trade union members (Barnes et al., 2015).  
In the NCR auto industry, the well-documented institutional weakness of  trade unions in India 
has sometimes combined with the regional composition of  the workforce in OEMs and Tier 1 firms. 
For example, at firms 1C and 1E in Binola village, plant unions were run by regular workers who 
came from local Yadav families. The families of  several union office-bearers owned land in the local 
village and rented rooms to contract workers who came from interstate regions or from Nepal, thus 
establishing a stake in the regional contract labour system.  
In most cases, the industrial campaigns of  regular and non-regular workers were kept separate, 
with some regular workers attempting to seek improvements in wages, bonuses and allowances via 
union-negotiated collective agreements, and contract and casual workers locked out of  formal 
bargaining processes. The wages and conditions of  these workers were either imposed unilaterally by 
managements or improved through an informal process of  concession bargaining, often after brief  
bouts of  industrial action.  
This pattern was affected by the most significant strike to occur in the auto industry to date at 
MSIL’s Manesar factory in 2011–2012. In 2011, workers initially organised for wage parity between 
regular, contract and casual workers and the “regularisation” of  contract workers’ employment. After 
several months of  lockouts, strikes and a factory occupation, the conflict culminated in a violent 
confrontation in July 2012, during which a manager was killed. Following this, MSIL temporarily 
closed the plant and fired over 550 regular workers and 1 500 contract workers. Of  this, 147 workers 
were arrested and imprisoned. At the time of  writing, most were yet to be convicted.  
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MSIL pursued two broad approaches during this conflict. On one hand, mass sackings 
demonstrate a despotic approach to employment relations that echo company practices during the 
2000–2001 strike in their Gurgaon factory. Most of  the sacked workers have been replaced with a 
new cohort of  employees. On the other hand, there is evidence that MSIL has significantly adjusted 
employment practices in response to the conflict. First, the firm significantly increased wages. 
Regular workers’ wages were increased from between 13 000 and 17 000 in June 2011, prior to the 
unrest, to between 32 000 and 36 000 by November 2013 (GWN, 2014). Second, MSIL 
announced a shift towards the direct employment of  “company casuals” to replace recruitment via 
labour contractors. By March 2014, the company claimed a combined workforce at its two plants in 
Gurgaon and Manesar of  12 500 regular workers, 1 100 apprentices and a group of  6 500 divided 
between company casuals and workers hired by contractors (Mukherjee, 2014). Company casuals 
were paid 11 000 per month – itself  a significant increase on former wages – and the remaining 
minority of  workers hired by contractors were paid 5 500 to 6 000 (GWN, 2014).  
The conflict at MSIL had reverberations throughout the regional supply chain. At the same 
time during the industrial conflict in late 2011, there were strikes by workers at least eleven Tier 1 
auto plants in the NCR (GWN, 2011). In addition, there is evidence that the outcome of  the conflict 
in 2012 impacted significantly upon employment relations in Tier 1 and Tier 2 firms in the region. In 
some cases – for example, at firms 1B and 1C – managers regularised an increased minority of  
contract workers, recognised a new plant-level union and negotiated a collective agreement with 
higher wages. As such, one can claim that workers’ associational power, via concession bargaining 
and limited unionisation, has increased in some firms. However, despite MSIL’s own policy change, 
these changes have not abolished the regional contract labour system. There is no evidence that 
contract workers have been included in collective representation, and high levels of  inequality persist 
in terms of  wages and worker treatment on the shop floor (Yadav, 2015). 
The structural and associational power of  workers in Tier 3 firms is completely different to 
outcomes in the higher-tier firms. The low-margin, low-wage environment in these firms means that 
conflict rarely occurs over basic wages. Combined with the absence of  trade unions from Tier 3 
firms – we found no evidence of  union membership or of  union efforts to recruit workers in Tier 3 
industrial zones in Faridabad or Gurgaon – this low-profit, low-wage environment encouraged many 
workers to pursue individualised strategies. As a worker at firm 3G explained: 
 
If  there were a problem, I would quit and look for other work. It is not as if  this is the only 
plant in Faridabad which has jobs; there are several other plants. I am confident that I would 
find work elsewhere. They put up notices for employment (6 December 2011). 
 
Furthermore, labour mobility meant that employers often complained about problems of  
labour shortages during the festival seasons, especially during Holi or Diwali. For example, the 
manager of  firm 3C in Faridabad told us: 
 
My main problem is a labour shortage. Some workers from Bihar return home for festivals 
and don’t come back on time or when they agreed. Sometimes I have to find casual workers 
[to replace them]. Sometimes I have to send work to other companies (9 April 2013). 
 
When interviewed a month after Diwali in 2011, a casual worker at firm 3G explained:  
Global Labour Journal, 2016, 7(3), Page 251 
 
There are ten men and one woman working here [but] eight of  them have gone on a leave 
and currently only three people are working here. Because of  Diwali most people are visiting 
their villages for the festive season (6 December 2011).  
 
The proprietor of  firm 3B explained how the Holi festival impacted on his business each year: 
“Workers go home for one month. So we have to lower production for the whole month. This is not 
good but we have no choice” (8 April 2013). Workers at firm 3I agreed that most firms cut 
production levels in response to the festival season as thousands of  workers temporarily left the 




The auto industry represents an instructive case study for this discussion, both because it is a 
strategically important sector in India’s emergence as a regional economic power and because there 
has arguably been less focus on building international labour solidarity among workers in more 
capital-intensive GVCs. Our modified framework can help explain why this sector, as a relational 
GVC characterised by the close collaboration and domination by OEMs over supply firms in 
multiple tiers, has led to flexibilised labour relations rather than the stable, high-wage environment 
historically associated with auto production on a global level. While fully addressing this 
contradiction would be the subject of  a separate paper, we suggest that two key explanatory factors 
are the peculiarities of  class formation in the region and the character of  the institutional-regulatory 
regime. On class formation, we have shown how the rapid emergence of  the industry has relied 
upon a flow of  migrant workers, mainly from cultivating castes with ongoing social ties to villages 
and towns in interstate regions. This mobilisation has occurred via a regional contract labour system 
and via a complex network of  small to medium-sized enterprises competing to service the demand, 
as well as strict price and quality controls of  the dominant OEMs. The structural and associational 
power of  labour is strongly shaped by the social and familial ties that bind workers in industrial and 
interstate areas and that influence the circulatory migration of  workers. On institutions, we have also 
shown how India’s complex system of  labour laws has failed to address the interests or rights of  
most workers in the region. For example, the operation of  a regional contract labour system 
contradicts protections stipulated by the Contract Labour Act. These explanations point to the need 
for a modified framework for labour research in GVCs by incorporating analysis of  social 
dimensions of  class formation as well as the state-institutional regime in regional development.  
In OEMs, Tier 1 and Tier 2 firms, low wages are driven by the regional contract labour system. 
Employers encourage competition among labour contractors to handle employment relations and 
pay most contract workers a base salary close to (and sometimes below) the Haryana minimum wage. 
Below Tier 2, where labour contractors are rare, low wages are underpinned by lead firm domination, 
price competition and low operating margins. In OEMs and higher-tier firms, contract workers have 
often taken collective action for better wages, conditions and union rights, but have been restricted 
by a lack of  legal protection or institutional support. In Tier 3 firms, workers express dissent by 
leaving or, sometimes, agitating for better employment conditions without formal collective 
bargaining over wage rates. Thus the responses, actions and interests of  workers in the industry are 
heavily dependent on the tier in question, which is itself  strongly influenced by the commercial 
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES
Field research for this study was conducted in Faridabad, Gurgaon, Manesar and Delhi over a
period of seven months in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
sixty-five workers, eleven employers, four labour contractors, eight trade union officials and one 
industry representative. Out of this, four focus groups were organised with a total of twenty-two 
workers. In addition to formal interviews, discussions with many people took place informally in 
communities and public areas. Apart from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), the 
names of companies, employers, employees and labour contractors have been kept anonymous. 
The full list of firms and coding used in the article is given below. Table 1 details the OEMs, Tier 
1 and Tier 2 firms in this study while Table 2 details the Tier 3 firms. These tiers are put into 
separate tables because, as we explain in the main article, the contract labour system does not 
operate fully in smaller, Tier 3 firms. We were also given guided tours of several Tier 1 and Tier 2
factories and Tier 3 workshops. Among the labour activists we spoke to were representatives 
from four trade union confederations: the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), the Hind 
Mazdoor Sabha (HMS), the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) and the New Trade Union 
Initiative (NTUI). 
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Table 1: Large and medium-sized firms (OEMs, Tier 1 and Tier 2) in this study











Manesar Passenger car 35 0.50 Three ex-regular 





71 0.18 Interview, Anil Kumar, 
AITUC Gurgaon 






80 0.16 Focus group, five 
regular workers, 11 
March 2013




80 X Plant manager, 7 April 
2013
B Gurgaon Engine and 
gear parts
78 0.52 Plant union president, 
13 March 2013
C Binola Car doors, 
exhausts
82 0.48 Plant union president, 
22 March 2013; senior 
supervisor, 6 April 
2013; 3 contract 
workers, 22 March 2013
D Gurgaon Sheet metal, 
dash, chassis 
98 0.25 4 regular workers, 11 
March 2013
E Binola Sheet metal, 
tubes
41 0.44 3 regular workers, 6 
April 2013
F Gurgaon Engine parts X X
X X
X X
Plant union president 




Engine parts Regular worker, 11 
March 2013
H Gurgaon Engine parts Regular worker, 11 
March 2013
I Binola Engine parts 50 0.68 Union president, 22 
March 2013
J Binola Gears, engine 
parts
52 0.53 Regular worker, 6 April 
2013
K Faridabad Engine parts X X
X X
X X
Plant manager, 15 April 
2013
L Gurgaon Gear parts Regular worker, 6 
December 2011
M Faridabad Bonded 
rubber parts
COO, 20 April 2013
2 A Udyog 
Vihar, 
Gurgaon
Brakes 70 0.58 7 workers, 13 April 
2013




Steel forging 60 X Vice-president, 11 
April; contract worker, 
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Gurgaon 13 April; supervisor, 13 
April, 2013
X = unknown








A Faridabad Sheet metal, 
spare parts
see below* 5 workers, 13 April
2013
B Sururpur, Faridabad Brake shoes, 
indicators
0.6 Owner, 8 April 2013





Manager, 9 April 2013




Owner, 9 April 2013
E Shiv Colony, Faridabad Fuel lines, tractor 
parts
Owner, 15 April 2013
F Shiv Colony, Faridabad Engine parts 0.48 Engineer, 15 April 
2013
G Mujessar, Faridabad Plating 0.71 Proprietor; 2 casual 
workers, 6 December 
2011
H Sanjay Colony, 
Faridabad
Spare parts 1.00 2 casuals, 18 April 
2013
I Sanjay Colony, 
Faridabad
Spare parts 1.00 5 workers, 18 April 
2013
J Manesar Fans, spare parts 1.00 Worker,8 December 
2011
K Welcome Industrial 
Complex, Sector 23, 
Faridabad
Spare parts 1.00 Owner, 18 April 2013
L Welcome Industrial 
Complex, Sector 23, 
Faridabad
Tractor parts 0.50 Worker, 18 April 2013
M Welcome Industrial 
Complex, Sector 23, 
Faridabad
Pistons, pulleys 1.00 Worker, 18 April 2013
N Binola Electroplating X Owner, 6 April 2013
X = unknown
*Note: at 3A, 77 per cent of workers were hired by labour contractors and there was no difference between regular 
and contract workers’ basic wages. This is the only Tier 3 firm we found that relied on contract workers.
 
